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Abstract 
 The natural resource curse paradox has given rise to a wide range of 
explanations, which look at the economic, social and political characteristics of 
resource-rich countries. This paper focuses on the political economy of natural 
resources and finds that controlling for sociopolitical factors eliminates the 
natural resource curse. The analysis then turns to these sociopolitical factors and 
examines the significant, complex and varied effects of democratization on 
economic growth in general, as well as in resource-rich countries in particular. I 
conclude that the type of institutions needed for economic development in 
resource-rich countries are not specific to either democratic or autocratic 
systems, but are equally likely to be adopted by either regime, so that no one 
ideology is more suitable than the other. A corollary to this, however, is the case 
of weak democracies or low democratization levels. Such states are unable to 
adopt the necessary strategies and institutions and, thus, pose the greatest threat 
to economic growth in resource-rich countries. On the other hand, highly 
autocratic systems in resource-rich countries, such as those in Bahrain and 
UAE, or perfectly democratic systems, such as those in Norway and Iceland, 
utilize resources more efficiently for economic development.  
 
 
 
   3 
 
Table of Contents  
1. INTRODUCTION 4 
2. SURVEY OF LITERATURE 6 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 16 
4. DISCUSSION OF THE KEY FINDINGS 36 
5. CONCLUSION 49 
 
Tables: 
1. Table 1: Summary Statistics            25 
2. Table 2: A Comparison of Certain Development Indicators           25 
3. Table 3: Base Regressions            33 
4. Table 4: Regression for Non-Oil Producing Economies            34 
5. Table 5: Regressions with Social Fractionalization Variable            35 
 
Figures: 
1. Figure 1: Growth & Democracy                                38 
2. Figure 2: Growth & Democracy, High-Income, Non-Oil Sample          44 
3. Figure 3: Interaction, with the Effect of SXP dependent on Democracy Level      46 
4. Figure 4: Democracy & SXP, High-Income, Resource-Rich Sample       47 
5. Figure 5: Interaction, with the Effect of Democratization dependent on SXP       48 
 
Bibliography                  51 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   4 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the 1970’s, Venezuelan Oil Minister, Juan Pablo Perez Alfonzo, 
predicted that oil would one day ruin Venezuela, referring to the much-coveted 
resource as “the devil’s excrement”. The ominous words have proved 
disturbingly accurate in the last few decades and the empirical evidence behind 
this has led economists to a baffling question: why is it that resource-rich 
countries have been surpassed in economic performance by resource-poor 
countries?  
Alfonso’s chilling prophecy was not limited to his own country, or even 
just to oil. Across geographical boundaries, economies with large deposits of 
natural resources, including fossil fuels, minerals and rocks, have demonstrated 
stunted development, compared with resource-poor economies. This paradox 
became increasingly evident in the latter half of the twentieth century, with the 
resource-poor countries, the so-called Asian Tigers, greatly outperforming most 
resource-rich developing countries, such as, Venezuela, Iraq, Brazil and India. 
This poses a critical question for development economists and policy makers, 
answers to which have ranged from purely economic to institutional reasons.  
There cannot be something inherently bad about the raw materials 
themselves, the answer must lie in their extraction or exploitation. This paper 
focuses on the political economy of the resource curse, and aims at explaining 
the sociopolitical reasons behind it. Section 2 summarizes the literature that has 
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provided the background and inspiration for my study, covering a wide range of 
explanations and theoretical approaches to the subject. In section 3, I discuss the 
panel dataset and conduct an empirical analysis of the effects of natural resource 
dependence, the polity and stability on economic development. Isolating the 
effects of natural resource dependence from key sociopolitical factors eliminates 
the natural resource curse. Further, democratization is, in general, beneficial for 
economic growth but natural resource dependence tends to dilute this effect. For 
high-income economies and highly-resource dependent economies 
democratization can even GDP per capita. In section 4 there is a detailed 
discussion of the key findings and section 5 concludes.   
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2. Survey of Literature 
 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, development problems became 
ever more urgent and the focus of a large body of economic literature. As the 
newly independent former colonies began struggling with economic hardship 
and stunted growth, the field of development economics became largely 
concerned with the reasons for this underperformance and solutions to the 
perceived problems. One issue that came to light in this discourse was that 
resource-poor, developing economies were outperforming the resource-rich 
ones.  
Richard M. Auty first coined the term “Resource Curse” in 1993 to 
describe this paradoxical trend. As the following studies illustrate, much of the 
literature in this field focused on purely economic explanations, such as 
declining prices of raw materials, susceptibility of the resource-rich economy to 
the Dutch Disease, as well as the idea that over-dependence on the primary 
sector results in underdevelopment of the overall economy.  
Focusing his research on Latin American countries, Auty (1993) 
hypothesized that large natural resource endowments may not be beneficial for 
the development of low and middle-income countries. He concluded that these 
economies were indeed distorted by over-dependence on the natural resource-
based industry as natural resource industries have few linkages and do not build 
human capital and, even more importantly, they cause the Dutch Disease, where 
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natural resource rents cause the exchange rate to appreciate and, thus, render 
other sectors of the economy uncompetitive. 
The research into the natural resource curse, however, dates further back 
than the coinage of the term. The work of Prebisch (1950) aimed at explaining 
the economic hardship of Latin America. He pointed out that the prices of raw 
materials, which were the main exports, were declining relative to manufactured 
goods. Singer (1950) reached a similar conclusion but pointed to differing 
income elasticities of demand for agricultural goods compared to manufactured 
goods. What came to be known as the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis brought forth 
the idea that countries with abundant natural resource wealth should not depend 
on it for growth.  
Sachs and Warner (1995) built on this work by conducting a worldwide 
study of the resource curse hypothesis. Their findings were largely in line with 
those discussed above, as they showed evidence of the Dutch Disease 
hypothesis, where labor shifts from “learning-by-doing” sectors to the primary 
sector. In a subsequent study Sachs and Warner (2001) explained the 
phenomenon by arguing that resource-rich countries rely heavily on the 
resource-based industry and, thus, fail to benefit from export-led growth. 
This was merely an aspect of the great body of literature concerned with 
the development problems of natural resource-dependent economies. While the 
Dutch Disease hypothesis and the idea of over-dependence are enlightening 
explanations, a deeper look at the factors at play is critical in understanding the 
link between natural resource dependence and economic development. 
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Favorable and growth-oriented policies are the driving forces behind economic 
development. Without these even the wealthiest country may face stagnation, 
inequality and poverty. Mehlum, et al. (2006) build upon the work by Sachs and 
Warner, but reach a different conclusion, where the quality of institutions 
determines whether or not a country suffers from the natural resource curse. 
Thus, those resource-abundant countries that have better quality institutions 
(according to the measure developed by the authors) do not suffer from a 
resource curse at all. Such institutions are crucial in controlling the unfavorable 
political incentives created by natural resource rents, especially corruption, as 
factions compete to control the resources and use them for their political gain. 
Politicians are seen as particularly susceptible to the temptations of natural 
resource booms, as they struggle to remain in power and use the resource rents 
to do so (Robinson et al., 2006). Another source of concern is that politicians in 
resource-rich countries need not rely on the private sector for tax revenue, and 
so they tend to leave it neglected and underdeveloped (Acemoglu, et al., 2000). 
This shift in the emphasis on sociopolitical causes represents a larger shift in the 
literature, where more recent studies focus largely on the polity and institutions. 
Thus, the economic policies and policy makers in resource-rich countries are of 
extreme relevance in this study of economic development.  
Auty (2001) describes “a developmental political state” as a necessary 
precondition for equitable economic development but one that is more likely to 
be found in resource-poor countries. Sound economic policies and long-term 
welfare exemplify this state. Auty (2001) then outlines the “staple trap model”, 
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where resource-rich economies develop an over-dependence on the primary 
sector, thus resulting in a lack of economic diversification, industrialization, 
urbanization and human capital.  This work suggests that the absence of a polity 
that makes investments in long-term development leads to the resource curse. 
Given the importance of economic policies in determining the economic 
fate of a nation, I intend on exploring further the relationship between the polity 
and economic performance. The work of Douglass North provides a foundation 
for this, highlighting the correlation between sound institutions, efficient 
enforcement mechanisms and economic performance. The central dilemma for 
developing countries is, therefore, the development of a polity that efficiently 
and impartially enforces contracts, property rights and the formal and informal 
rules that structure economic exchange. Another issue of concern is that 
efficient property rights may not exist because of bribery or because powerful 
groups might be blocking them as they may be benefitting from the lack thereof. 
The fact that incentives for corruption are greater in countries where the 
potential benefits, that is, natural resource rents, are larger, explains why the 
issues outlined by North, inefficient institutions, bribery and lack of property 
rights and enforcement, may occur in resource-rich economies. 
The result of inefficient and corrupt institutions and polity is that the 
cost of transacting in third world economies tends to be very high. Moreover 
lack of property rights and poor enforcement mechanisms mean that firms tend 
to be small and large firms can exist only under government protection, so that 
development in other sectors of the economy is obstructed. While North’s work 
   10 
was not specific to resource-rich countries, it outlines a problem where the 
institutional structure does not encourage productive economic and 
developmental activity, and stands as an obstacle to socioeconomic 
development. 
The intersection of politics and economics is brought to light in North’s 
work, and is a motivation for this study. Given the large body of literature that 
has hypothesized correlations between natural resource abundance and 
sociopolitical issues of political instability, authoritarianism and conflict, it is 
conventional belief now that natural resource rents encourage bad institutions, 
political uncertainty and violence conflict. With this as my theoretical 
background, I intend on testing the hypothesis that the channel through which 
resource dependence affects economic growth is the polity. As rent-seeking 
elites have a source of easy revenue without having to invest in good institutions 
and enforcement, there is little incentive for long-term development. My 
analysis will lead me to a discussion of what characterizes a favorable polity in 
the context of natural resource abundance. As the data will show, there is no 
clear answer to this question but, for now, let us return to the foundations of this 
study.  
It seems intuitive that the potential control of a large natural resource 
endowment would offer great incentives for violence between sociopolitical 
factions. Collier and Hoeffler (2005) argue that the existence of natural resource 
rents increases the risk of conflict, as they can finance rebellions. Further they 
are likely to be looted by corrupt governments owing to ethnic fractionalization 
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or inefficient institutions.  Wantchekon (2000) addresses a number of potential 
political effects of natural resource abundance. He argues that resource-rich 
countries are likely to have authoritarian governments as the rents create 
incentives for governments in power to become repressive and strengthen their 
hold. This also creates potential for open conflict or civil war. Of interest here is 
the idea that the correlation between natural resource wealth and economic 
development occurs through a medium – whether it’s the rent-seeking activities 
of factions or the socio-political structure and institutions of the society.  
Economists have also brought to light evidence that social 
fractionalization can have a negative effect on development. Easterly and 
Levine (1997) constructed a measure of ethnic diversity to find its correlation 
with economic growth. They find a negative relationship between ethnic 
fractionalization and income per capita. While resource-rich economies have 
failed to develop at steady rates, many of them have also been undergoing war, 
ethnic tensions and violence. Further the creation of rents in resource-rich 
economies tends to aggravate conflict and tensions, making the level of social 
fractionalization deeply relevant to any study of the performance of resource-
rich countries. 
In addition to sociopolitical peace and stability, the type of political 
regime also has a role to play and is a central point of focus of this paper. From 
Venezuela to the Middle East, resource-rich countries tend to have authoritarian 
regimes and do not benefit from democratic institutions. Ross (2001) explores 
what he refers to as the “oil impedes democracy claim”. He found that oil 
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wealth does harm democracy and even more so in developing countries. 
Although he focused largely on oil-dependent countries, he concluded that both 
oil and mineral dependence lead to a “rentier effect”, where governments elude 
democratic pressures through low taxes and high spending. Given the strong 
empirical evidence of the negative correlation between resource wealth and 
democracy, this area is worth probing further.  
The central aim of this paper is to study the relationship between 
resource-dependence and economic growth, as well as the relationship between 
political stability and GDP growth in resource-dependent economies. As the 
data shows in section 3, resource-rich countries tend to be less democratic than 
the resource-poor. A study of the possible effects of democratic institutions on 
these economies is of great importance. While the economic effects of 
democracy have been heavily debated, the noneconomic merits of such a system 
that promotes accountability and liberty need no explanation. Collier and 
Hoeffler (2006) find an ambiguous, and often negative, correlation between 
economic growth and democracy in the context of natural resource abundance, 
but this should not lead one to conclude that the agenda of promoting 
democracy in autocratic societies is counterproductive. The authors trace the 
negative relationship to the idea that the pre-existing institutions in developing 
countries are corrupt, so that bribery and vote buying are rampant and cannot be 
prosecuted as the judiciary and the police are rarely independent. The existence 
of large resource rents worsens the outcome, as sources of financing for corrupt 
activities are abundant. The problem here lies in the fact that developing 
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countries do not have as mature and thorough a system of checks and balances 
as developed countries. Where there are large natural resource endowments, 
therefore, this can create even more negative incentives, as the opportunities for 
embezzlement and corruption are huge.  
It is important to note, though, that a system of checks and balances 
takes time to develop. As numerous economists have pointed out, institutions 
are sticky and historically persistent. North (1990) made a significant 
contribution to the literature on institutional change in his discussion of the 
forces that shape it. He argues that the initial set-up costs of institutions are very 
large and that there are increasing returns to institutions. Thus, once an 
institutional framework is established, it is very costly to change it and the 
benefits may not be realized in the short run. As a result, given a world 
characterized by imperfect information, persistent underdevelopment will result 
as existing institutions are continually reinforced. Thus, once a country is on a 
particular development path, economic or political, it is difficult to set it on a 
new course. Countries that face persistent underdevelopment are trapped in a 
bad equilibrium where institutions and policies are unfavorable for economic 
development. Corruption, inefficient property rights and lack of investment in 
long-term development projects, such as infrastructure, education and finance, 
may be some of the characteristics the institutional structures in these countries. 
As an overhaul of the economic and political institutions is costly, the bad 
equilibrium persists and development does not occur. Thus, once exploitive and 
corrupt institutions are established, they are likely to endure and harm economic 
   14 
growth. In the case of the developing world, much of which is former colonies, 
the establishment of these institutions can be traced to colonial times. 
Acemoglu, et al. (2000) find that in resource-rich countries in particular, 
colonizers tended to establish inferior institutions which best served the purpose 
of extracting resources for profit rather than promoting economic growth. This 
finding is critical in explaining what appears to be a curse of natural resources, 
but may be better described as a curse of bad institutions.  
As valuable natural resource endowments offer great short-term profits 
they may encourage and reinforce such institutions, just as they did in the case 
of colonial settlements discussed above. If the reason that natural resource rich 
countries may be unable to develop is that they cannot establish favorable 
institutions and are trapped in bad equilibria, the question arises of the kind of 
institutions they need for economic growth.  
Botswana is an example worthy of discussion here. While the country is 
the largest diamonds-producer in the world, it has enjoyed political stability and 
economic growth since independence over four decades ago. A significant 
difference between Botswana and its resource-rich counterparts is its long-
running democracy. Relatively accountable and stable governance has led to 
high investments in education, health, most notably, measures against 
HIV/AIDS, and moves towards diversification of the economy. To extend the 
discussion to energy sources, let us consider Norway, one of the largest oil 
exporters in the world. Its unparalleled success in converting its oil endowment 
into economic growth rather than a curse has resulted in the country being 
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named the most developed country in the world in the UNHDI list. While oil 
has been considered the most volatile and counterproductive of natural 
resources, this example shows that the wealth it produces has the potential to 
fuel long-term growth and development. It is not the substance in itself that is to 
blame. Further pointing to the Dutch Disease does not go to the heart of the 
problem. In fact, as the sixth largest oil exporter in the world, Norway is highly 
dependent on its energy, which accounted for 50% of exports, 22% of GDP and 
27% of resource revenues in 2009. What has made Norway distinct from its 
resource-rich counterparts is its long-term strategy, characterized by high public 
spending and welfare policies. These examples suggest then, that good 
governance and development policies may result in an outcome very different to 
the natural resource curse. This idea lies at the heart of this paper and motivates 
the empirical analysis. 
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3. Data Description and Analysis 
 
3.1. Key Variables and Sources 
 
The dataset includes 147 countries and ranges from the years 1960 to 1999. 
Only those countries for which data was unavailable have been excluded from 
the sample. The data is recorded in 5-year averages, i.e., 1960-1964, 1964-1969, 
… , 1995-1999. The variables included are detailed below.  
 
Log of GDP:    
This is the dependent variable, which is intended to indicate the level of 
economic growth for each country. It is calculated using real GDP per capita 
(PPP adjusted), and is measured at the beginning of each 5-year period. This 
variable was extracted from Collier & Hoeffler’s (2007) dataset. 
 
Share of Exports that are Primary Products (SXP):   
A measure of primary commodity exports as a fraction of GDP, this 
independent variable is a proxy to natural resource abundance and it ranges 
from 0 to 1. Using level of primary exports has been the norm in literature 
exploring the natural resource curse. Primary products are all raw materials 
extracted from the land and ocean and include industries such as agriculture, 
forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying. This variable was extracted from Collier 
& Hoeffler’s (2007) dataset. Henceforth, the abbreviation SXP will be used 
interchangeably with level of natural resource abundance. 
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At Civil War (atcivwar):      
This is a civil war dummy that takes on a value of 1 if the country is 
experiencing civil war. If a minimum of 1000 battle-related deaths occurs in any 
given year, the civil war dummy takes on a value of 1. This variable was 
extracted from Collier & Hoeffler’s (2007) dataset. 
 
Social Fractionalization (frac):     
This indicates the level of ethnic and religious fractionalization in each country. 
The range is from 0, where the population is completely homogenous, to 10000 
where the population is completely heterogeneous. Ethnic fractionalization is 
defined as the probability that any two randomly drawn members of the 
population will belong to two different ethnic groups. The religious 
fractionalization index was drawn using data on religious affiliations. Together, 
the product of the two indices plus the one that has the greater value equals the 
social fractionalization index. This variable was extracted from Collier & 
Hoeffler’s (2007) dataset. 
 
Polity:  
The values range from -10, for a highly autocratic system of governance, to 
+10, for a strong democratic system. The variable is a combination of two 
separate measures of “democracy” and “autocracy”. Given the subjectivity of 
the two terms it is worthwhile to describe their usage here further. The former is 
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assessed on three levels, firstly, the existence of institutions and procedures that 
allow citizens to express their preferences and choose their leaders, secondly, 
constraints on executive power and, finally, the extent of civil liberty. Thus, 
countries that excel in the three aspects described above are seen as strong 
democracies. The second measure, autocracy, explores the level of competitive 
participation in politics, the procedures of selection of the chief executive and 
the institutional restraints on executive power. Thus, countries that lack 
competitive political participation, whose chief executives are selected by a 
political elite and where the chief executive’s power is relatively unconstrained 
are seen as autocracies. This variable was extracted from the Polity IV dataset. 
 
Regime Change (regchange): 
Where the polity score changes by over four points within any five-year 
interval, it is though to be a period of regime change. This is consistent with the 
Polity IV Project, which recognizes changes of over 4 points within three years 
as regime changes. To apply this threshold to my dataset the time period is 
altered to five years. Thus, regime change is a dummy variable, which takes on 
the value 1 for a period of regime change and 0 otherwise. This variable is 
intended to explain the effects of political change, instability and uncertainty on 
economic development.  
 
Democracy (Dem):  
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Using the Polity III dataset, Collier & Hoeffler calculated this variable to 
measure the openness of institutions. It ranges from 0 to 10, with higher 
numbers indicating greater levels of democracy, or openness. 
 
Oil:  
This is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 for those countries where the 
bulk of GDP reflects the value of extracted oil (Mankiw, et al., 1992). In this 
case GDP will necessarily be closely and positively correlated with the level of 
natural resource dependence and will, therefore, skew the data. Another source 
of concern is that oil is a commodity that is associated with an unusual amount 
of volatility and unrest. As Terry Karl (2007) notes, oil possesses certain 
characteristics that set it apart from other resources. These include its 
importance as an energy source that fueled global industrialization, the fact that 
it is scarce and non-renewable and its price volatility and consequent boom-bust 
cycles. The rents from oil are also large compared to other raw materials – 
leading to its appropriate description as “black gold” – and mean that a large oil 
endowment has great potential to skew the incentives of leaders and politicians 
and encourage unrest and corruption. 
 
Regional dummies:  
There are regional dummies for Africa, Asia and Latin America. These 
variables takes on a value of 1 if the country is in the region specified, and 0 
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otherwise. It is included to control for any regional or geographical differences 
that may account for inter-country differences in growth rates. 
 
GDP/Capita: 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population, 
expressed in current U.S. dollars, for the year 2008. The source is World 
Development Indicators. Data is available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD.   
 
Literacy Rate: Adult literacy rate is the percentage of people ages 15 and above who can, with  understanding,  read  and  write  a  short,  simple  statement  on  their everyday  life.  The  data  used  is  for  the  year  2008.  The  source  is  World Development  Indicators,  and  the  data  is  available  at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS.   Life Expectancy: Life  expectancy  at  birth  indicates  the  number  of  years  a  newborn  infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay  the same  throughout  its  life. The data used  is  for  the year 2008. The source  is  World  Development  Indicators  and  the  data  is  available  at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN.   
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Public Spending on Education: 
This variable expresses the government spending on education as a percentage 
of total GDP. The data used is for the year 2002 as there was considerable 
missing data for more recent years. The source is World Bank Development 
Indicators and the data can be found at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS/countries.  
 
Public Health Expenditure: 
This variable represents public health expenditure as a percentage of total 
expenditure on health in the nation. The data used is for the year 2008. The 
source is World Bank Development Indicators and the data can be found at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.PUBL/countries.  
 
 
 
3.2. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the full sample, as well as two 
subgroups, one of high-income countries and the other of middle and low-
income countries. The division is in accordance with the World Bank’s 
classification of countries by Gross National Income, where the high-income 
countries (those with an income per capita greater than $12,196 in the year 
2009) are placed in the “High-Income Countries” sample, and the rest are 
lumped in the “Middle and Low-Income Countries” sample. 
As the first row indicates, on average, the high-income economies tend 
to have greater levels of natural resource dependence. Thus, countries with large 
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natural resource endowments are not necessarily poor, as the resource curse 
hypothesis would have one believe. This observation reinforces the idea that it 
is not the natural resource endowment that often results in the paradox of plenty, 
but other factors that may or may not be related to it.  
As the table goes on to show, the lower-income economies tend to be 
less democratic than the high-income countries. Moreover, they suffer greater 
social fractionalization and a higher incidence of civil war as well as regime 
change. Together this shows that lower income countries are not only more 
authoritarian but also suffer greater unrest and political instability. This provides 
the basis for the detailed study of the relationship between the polity and 
economic development in the next two sections. While lower-income countries 
are not distinct from higher-income countries in terms of natural resource 
dependence, there are differences with regard to sociopolitical climate. The 
implication is that the answer to the paradox of plenty lies in the political 
economy of developing nations, and the next section will empirically test this 
hypothesis. 
Given the large body of literature concerned with the effect of natural 
resource endowments on economic growth it is worth considering whether or 
not there is empirical evidence of a natural resource curse. Mehlum, et al. 
(2006) describe countries with a ratio of primary product exports to total exports 
(SXP) of greater than 10%, as highly resource-dependent. Identifying those 
countries with an SXP value greater than 0.1 for a majority of the forty-year 
period, resulted in a sample of 64 low-dependence countries and 83 high-
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dependence countries. Finally, a fourth sample was made to represent only those 
high-SXP countries, which have authoritarian institutions, or an average polity 
value of zero or less. Table 2 shows some important statistics for these 
countries.  
I explored the areas of income per capita, education and health as these 
are considered important indicators of living standard, well-being and 
socioeconomic development. As the table shows, the low-SXP economies have 
a far higher income per capita than the high-SXP economies, on average. The 
high-SXP economies perform lower than the world average, even though 
valuable natural resources such as oil and diamonds, can contribute heavily to 
GDP. Moreover, once the democratic countries are taken out of the subset, GDP 
per capita falls considerably lower. This indicates that countries with high 
resource endowments may perform even worse if they are non-democratic. 
For the literacy rate and life expectancy rows, the high-SXP nations 
perform lower than the world average, while the authoritarian, high-SXP 
nations continue to perform the worst. This indicates that countries with large 
natural resource endowments may perform worse in areas of social 
development. The fact that the non-democratic nations in this group perform 
even worse, indicates that democratic institutions may be important for 
socioeconomic development. It also reaffirms the idea that large natural 
resource rents create political and economic incentives that are incompatible 
with economic development, for example, to loot the easily available wealth 
rather than invest it in long-term development projects. To explore this area 
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further the table looks at public expenditure on the key variables of education 
and health, as such investments are crucial to economic growth. Public 
expenditure on education appears the lowest for the low-SXP nations. This 
should be interpreted with caution, however, as the expenditure is expressed as 
a percentage of GDP and may be low because the countries in this sample have 
relatively high levels of GDP. It is important to note that the authoritarian, high-
SXP nations perform worse than their democratic counterparts in this area. In 
terms of public expenditure on health, the low-SXP nations perform the best 
while, the authoritarian, high-SXP continue to underperform. 
Finally, the last row shows that the average polity level for high-SXP 
nations is far lower than that for the world. The polity value in the last column 
simply indicates that the authoritarian, high-SXP nations are defined by a polity 
value lower than 0. The numbers imply that high-SXP nations are more likely to 
be authoritarian than low-SXP nations. These results are in keeping with the 
literature, and indicate the need to further explore the interaction of the polity 
and natural resource endowments.  
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Table 1. Mean value and standard deviation, for each independent variable for 
different samples. 
Variable 
 
Full 
Sample 
High 
Income 
Countries 
Middle and 
Low Income 
Countries 
SXP 0.16 (0.19) 
0.19 
(0.28) 
0.15 
(0.13) 
Democracy 3.96 (4.20) 
7.13 
(4.22) 
2.67 
(3.44) 
Social 
Fractionalizat
ion 
1880 
(1921.31) 
837.65 
(1154.18) 
2280.11 
(2005.49) 
Regime 
Change 
0.34 
(0.47) 
0.26 
(0.44) 
0.38 
(0.48) 
At Civil War 0.12 (0.32) 
0.003 
(0.06) 
0.17 
(0.37) 
Oil 0.13 (0.34) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
0.09 
(0.29) 
 
 
 
Table 2. Average income per capita, literacy rate, life expectancy and polity values 
for different samples. 
 World Average Low-SXP High-SXP High-SXP & 
Authoritarian 
GDP/capita $14749.
29 
$17032.
87 
$12744.
19 
$8075.6
7 
Literacy Rate 79.47% 81.71% 77.86% 75.68% 
Life 
Expectancy 
68.34 
years 
70.71 
years 
66.20 
years 
63.65 
years 
Public 
Education 
Expenditure 
4.73% 4.52% 4.97% 4.55% 
Public Health 
Expenditure 
57.5% 58.38% 56.93% 53.09% 
Polity -0.2 0.63 -1.03 Polity<0 
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3.3. Methodology  
The purpose of my empirical analysis is to explore the effects of 
political regime and climate on economic growth, in the context of natural 
resource abundance. Using panel data on 147 countries, I explore whether or not 
there is evidence of a negative correlation between natural resource dependence 
and GDP growth. Adding variables that are indicative of the sociopolitical 
climate in each country, I was further able to observe how sociopolitical factors 
interact with natural resource dependence to affect growth outcomes. As this is 
ultimately a study of economic development, observing dynamics and 
developments over time is absolutely necessary. Development is not an 
immediate occurrence and, as is extremely relevant to this study, it takes time to 
develop institutions and policies that are compatible with economic growth. 
Thus, the motivation behind panel data was to observe economic and political 
dynamics over time. Moreover, data across several countries gives indications 
of general trends and prerequisites for development, rather than country-specific 
explanations.  
The next step in formulating an econometric methodology was choosing 
which variables to include in the model. The dependent variable is log of GDP 
per capita, as GDP per capita stands as the most useful quantitative measure of 
economic growth. Next the measure for natural resource dependence was 
chosen, as well as controls for geographic region. An additional control, the oil 
dummy, was used to control for the effect of oil, as it is considered to be the 
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natural resource that is most incompatible with development and stability. 
Finally, the most useful sociopolitical indicators had to be identified. To capture 
the effect of the polity, I wished to account for the nature of the political regime 
and institutions, as well as for their stability. Thus, the democracy variable 
indicates the nature of the regime, while the regime change variable indicates 
the uncertainty of the political climate and the fragility of the state. The other 
area I wished to explore was social unrest as a society riddled with violence and 
factionalism is unattractive for investment and unlikely to develop. The civil 
war dummy represents social unrest and violence, and the social 
fractionalization indicator is used as an alternate measure of the same.  
Finally, a random effects model was chosen as the sociopolitical 
variables and the regional dummies can account for some of the country-
specific differences. The base regression takes the following form, 
Yit = α + βXit + ε, 
where Y is log of GDP per capita, β is a vector of regression coefficients and Xit 
includes all the independent explanatory and control variables.  
 
3.4 Results 
 The hypothesis was that natural resource endowments, in the enormous 
wealth they have the potential to produce, are beneficial to economic growth. In 
the absence of a growth-compatible sociopolitical climate, however, that same 
wealth has the potential to create corrupt and inefficient institutions, 
sociopolitical conflict and instability and economic decline. Thus, the 
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regressions include controls for sociopolitical factors, to isolate the effect of 
natural resource dependence. It was further hypothesized that democratic 
institutions, owing to their transparent and accountable nature, would be most 
beneficial for economic growth. Meanwhile, given the great body of literature 
discussing the incentives for conflict that are produced by natural resource rents, 
it was hypothesized that sociopolitical uncertainty and conflict could explain 
much of the growth problems of the resource-rich, developing world. These 
factors were then explored further to reach a better understanding of the 
development problems of resource-rich countries. 
The base regression (Regression 1.1) is on the entire sample of 147 
countries, while the regression in the second column of Table 1 is for a subset of 
high-income economies and the third column is for the remaining low and 
middle-income countries, as defined by the World Bank. Table 4 carries out the 
same regressions, but each sample is reduced to exclude oil-producers to ensure 
the effects are robust. 
 The main regression results indicate that the relationship between natural 
resource dependence and economic growth is positive and significant for the 
full sample, as well as the subset of high-income economies. While the positive 
effect does extend to the low and middle-income sample, it is insignificant. 
Regressions 1.1 and 1.2 also suggest that, there are decreasing returns to natural 
resource dependence, so that higher levels of dependence are decreasingly 
beneficial for economic growth. This may lead to the conclusion that as long as 
dependence does not increase beyond a certain point, there will be a positive 
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effect on economic growth. However, the finding is insignificant and does not 
extend to Regression 1.3. The large and positive coefficients on SXP confirm 
the hypothesis that natural resource abundance, in isolation from other factors, 
can fuel great economic growth.  
 Table 4 replicates the regressions in Table 3, but on a smaller dataset 
that now excludes the oil-dependent economies. While there are certain 
differences, the positive effect of natural resource dependence is consistent and 
robust. There are two notable differences that are worthy of discussion here. 
First, the increase in the coefficients on SXP suggests that oil is less beneficial 
for economic growth than other natural resources. Second, the weak evidence 
for decreasing returns to natural resource dependence in regression 1.2 becomes 
significant in regression 2.2 
 The regressions in Tables 1 and 2 show that after controlling for 
sociopolitical factors, as well as, geographical location, natural resource 
dependence has a positive effect on economic growth. This relationship is only 
insignificant in the case of the middle and low-income group. This shows that 
while the relationship may be positive, the two variables may also be 
uncorrelated. The important conclusion to draw here is that no negative 
relationship was found that might explain the development problems of the 
middle and low-income countries. The regression analysis, therefore, goes on to 
explore the effects of the polity on economic growth.  
 The coefficient on the democracy variable for the full sample in Table 1 
is positive but insignificant. A look at Regression 1.2 for the high-income group 
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shows a significant relationship where the positive effects of democracy set in 
only after a certain point. A simple calculation shows that this point occurs 
where the democracy value is 3.75. This indicates that once institutions have 
developed to a point where they are sufficiently open and transparent, 
democracy can have huge benefits for economic growth. This result extends to 
Table 2 where the oil producing countries are excluded, so that the increasing 
returns to democratic institutions are significant and robust for the high-income 
group. Regression 1.3 and 2.3 show that the positive effects of democracy are 
significant and robust for the middle and low-income group, with the higher 
positive coefficient in Regression 2.3 implying that democratic institutions may 
be less valuable for oil-dependent countries. These regressions further show that 
there are decreasing returns to democratic institutions so that, at greater levels of 
openness and transparency, the gains in economic growth become smaller and 
smaller. While this coefficient is insignificant, the nonlinearities in the 
relationship between economic growth and democracy will be explored further. 
 Given the significantly positive effect of democratic institutions on 
economic growth, it is important to further explore the effect of institutions in 
the presence of large natural resource endowments. The coefficient on the 
interaction variable (SXP*dem) is intended to show whether the effect of 
natural resource dependence on economic growth depends on the polity of the 
country. The value is negative, significant and robust across all the samples in 
Tables 3 and 4, implying that democratic institutions are not beneficial to 
economic growth in a context of natural resource dependence. Thus, while 
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democratic institutions are, in general, beneficial for economic growth, for 
countries with large natural resource endowments, authoritarian governments 
are more favorable. This outcome is discussed in greater detail in the next 
section.  
 The next two variables in Tables 3 and 4 explore the effects of political 
uncertainty and social unrest on economic growth. The regime change variable 
has a negative and significant effect that is robust throughout the samples, with 
the exception of the high-income groups. The insignificance here may, however, 
be explained by the fact that regime change is rare in this group and, therefore, 
does not correlate with fluctuations in GDP per capita. In fact, as the summary 
statistics show, the average incidence of regime change is far lower for the high-
income group than for the middle and low-income group. This indicates that 
political stability may play a large part in economic growth outcomes.  
 The civil war variable is intended to denote the effect of social unrest on 
economic growth, which is found to be insignificant across all the samples in 
Tables 3 and 4. The variable is omitted in Regression 2.2 as none of the 
countries in the sample had a civil war during the time interval studied. The 
civil war variable has been substituted for the social fractionalization variable, 
which also represents the level of social unrest, in the regressions in Table 5. 
The results continue to be insignificant, except in the case of Regression 3.2, 
where there is a significant, positive effect of social fractionalization on 
economic growth. It should be noted, however, as the summary statistics show, 
that, on average, the high-income nations are far less ethnically and religiously 
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fractionalized than the middle and low-income nations. This may be indicative 
of the fact that below certain levels and in certain conditions, ethnic 
fractionalization is not harmful. One of these conditions may be the existence of 
just and democratic institutions that promote stability, invest in public welfare 
and, therefore, prevent social unrest. Thus, as the summary statistics show, 
high-income countries have far more democratic institutions than the 
developing countries as well as the whole world, on average.  
 Further, table 5 shows that the coefficients on the interaction variable 
(SXP*frac) are negative, but insignificant, for all the samples. Thus, while 
natural resource abundance may be negative for economic growth where there is 
social fractionalization, it is also likely that the two may be uncorrelated. I 
conclude, therefore, that social unrest does not play a significant role in 
economic growth and the null hypothesis must be rejected.  
 The oil variable in Table 3 is designed to control for the abundance of 
oil, as it is often believed to be the most contentious of the natural resources. As 
discussed previously, oil has been hypothesized to hinder democratic 
institutions and to create conflict. The results show, however, that the existence 
of oil wealth has a positive effect on GDP per capita. This is significant only for 
the full sample, and is intuitive as oil is one of the most valuable resources and 
oil-dependent countries such as UAE and Saudi Arabia earn high incomes from 
it.  
 Finally, the last three variables are regional dummies. The Africa 
dummy is omitted for the high-income group as none of the countries in this 
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sample are in Africa. The negative coefficients on Africa and Asia are negative, 
significant and robust across Tables 3 and 4, while the coefficient on the Latin 
American dummy is ambiguous in its effect on economic growth. 
 
 
Table 3. Economic Growth, Natural Resource Dependence and the Polity 
 Regression 1.1 Regression 1.2 Regression 1.3 
SXP 
 
1.157*** 
(0.369) 
1.630** 
(0.722) 
0.501 
(0.488) 
SXP2 -0.177 
(0.402) 
-0.774 
(0.635) 
0.646 
(0.795) 
dem 0.029 
(0.019) 
-0.240*** 
(0.074) 
0.060*** 
(0.019) 
dem2 0.003 
(0.002) 
0.032*** 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
SXP*dem -0.232*** 
(0.035) 
-0.243*** 
(0.069) 
-0.170*** 
(0.040) 
regchange -0.073** 
(0.032) 
-0.058 
(0.102) 
-0.078*** 
(0.030) 
atcivwar -0.005 
(0.043) 
0.233 
(0.402) 
0.010 
(0.038) 
Oil 0.467*** 
(0.156) 
0.041 
(0.170) 
0.192 
(0.209) 
Africa -1.805*** 
(0.134) 
(omitted) -1.174*** 
(0.249) 
Latin 
America 
-0.815*** 
(0.156) 
0.600 
(0.377) 
-0.241 
(0.261) 
Asia -0.868*** 
(0.149) 
-0.050 
(0.165) 
-0.672*** 
(0.265) 
Observations 1176 328 848 
Notes: Dependent variable: log of GDP per capita. Standard deviations are in 
parentheses.  
*=significant at the 10% level 
**= significant at the 5% level 
***= significant at the 1% level 
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Table 4. Economic Growth, Natural Resource Dependence and the Polity in non-
Oil Exporting Countries 
 Regression 2.1 Regression 2.2 Regression 2.3 
SXP 
 
1.586*** 
(0.513) 
4.338*** 
(1.023) 
0.505 
(0.593) 
SXP2 -0.918 
(0.781) 
-3.098** 
(1.280) 
0.536 
(1.073) 
dem 0.022 
(0.021) 
-0.137* 
(0.073) 
0.049** 
(0.020) 
dem2 0.004 
(0.002) 
0.024*** 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
SXP*dem -0.224*** 
(0.042) 
-0.393*** 
(0.081) 
-0.148*** 
(0.049) 
regchange -0.064* 
(0.034) 
-0.065 
(0.113) 
-0.074** 
(0.032) 
atcivwar -0.008 
(0.044) 
(omitted) 0.008 
(0.039) 
Africa -1.719*** 
(0.138) 
(omitted) -1.177*** 
(0.241) 
Latin 
America 
-0.724*** 
(0.157) 
0.459* 
(0.279) 
-0.207 
(0.254) 
Asia -0.949*** 
(0.155) 
-0.151 
(0.134) 
-0.710*** 
(0.259) 
Observations 1016 248 768 
Notes: Dependent variable: log of GDP per capita. Standard deviations are in 
parentheses.  
*=significant at the 10% level 
**= significant at the 5% level 
***= significant at the 1% level 
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Table 5. Economic Growth, Natural Resource Dependence and Social 
Fractionalization 
 Regression 3.1 Regression 3.2 Regression 3.3 
SXP 
 
1.794*** 
(0.465) 
1.899*** 
(0.733) 
0.773 
(0.531) 
SXP2 -0.519 
(0.418) 
-0.80* 
(0.642) 
0.835 
(0.818) 
dem 0.027 
(0.019) 
-0.191*** 
(0.069) 
0.060*** 
(0.018) 
dem2 0.003 
(0.002) 
0.027*** 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
SXP*dem -0.228*** 
(0.036) 
-0.207*** 
(0.079) 
-0.169*** 
(0.040) 
regchange -0.069** 
(0.032) 
-0.044 
(0.093) 
-0.079** 
(0.030) 
frac -0.00002 
(0.00003) 
0.0002*** 
(0.00005) 
0.00002 
(0.00004) 
SXP*frac -0.0001 
(0.00008) 
-0.0003 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
Africa -1.745*** 
(0.149) 
(omitted) -1.123*** 
(0.259) 
Latin 
America 
-0.872*** 
(0.155) 
0.314 
(0.360) 
-0.274 
(0.274) 
Asia -0.954*** 
(0.152) 
-0.061 
(0.151) 
-0.668** 
(0.276) 
Observations 1176 328 848 
Notes: Dependent variable: log of GDP per capita. Standard deviations are in 
parentheses.  
*=significant at the 10% level 
**= significant at the 5% level 
***= significant at the 1% level 
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4. Discussion of the Key Findings  
 
4.1. Is there a Natural Resource Curse? 
One of the key findings of this paper is that, after controlling for 
sociopolitical factors, natural resource dependence does not have a negative 
effect on economic growth. On the contrary, the positive effect is robust and is 
significant in all cases except for the middle and low-income sample. This is 
consistent with conventional thinking that large natural resource endowments 
are less beneficial for middle and low-income countries (Auty, 1993). It is 
important to note, however, that the coefficient is not negative for any of the 
samples. This reaffirms my hypothesis that natural resource abundance is, itself, 
neutral to economic growth and the hypotheses of other researchers such as, 
Mehlum et al., who divide countries into those with good institutions versus 
those with bad institutions and show that the former do not suffer a resource 
curse at all (Mehlum, et al., 2006). Thus, the affect of natural resource 
abundance on economic growth is dependent upon the political economy. 
Therefore, let us now turn the discussion to the political economy of the 
resource curse.  
 
4.2. The Effect of Democratization on Economic Growth  
While the positive effects of democracy are robust across all samples, it is 
insignificant for the full sample. Looking at the effects for the subsets of high-
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income countries and middle and low-income countries provides more insight 
into this relationship. In general, the effects for both groups are positive, but the 
relationship is complex and there are important differences. The non-linear 
relationship is significant for the high-income sample but insignificant for the 
developing countries group.  
As the summary statistics show, developing countries are less likely to have 
democratic regimes than high-income countries. In fact, the conditions that are 
favorable for the existence and development of democratic institutions have 
been the subject of a great body of literature. Lipset (1959) suggested that 
wealthier countries were better able to sustain democracies owing to their 
improved social conditions and more equitable socioeconomic structure, which 
bring social stability. Muller’s (1995) study reinforces this conclusion, as he 
finds that income inequality obstructs democratic institutions. As inequality is 
generally higher in developing countries, this explains why they are less likely 
to have democratic regimes. This aspect of the literature concerns itself with the 
effect of income level on the polity. It is important to consider the opposite 
direction of causality as well, since the quality and nature of institutions and 
policies inevitably effect subsequent economic development.  
A large body of literature is concerned with the affect of democratic 
institutions on economic growth, and its dependence on the level of economic 
development. The debate is ongoing and inconclusive as there are prominent 
political and economic theorists on each side. The arguments of the pro-
authoritarianism theorists center around the idea that, given all the issues facing 
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third world countries, only authoritarian regimes can spur economic growth. An 
example of this is that social fractionalization may be less harmful for 
development in autocratic countries, where any grievances can be silenced and 
rebellions can be repressed. Those arguing for the positive effects of democracy 
focus on the benefits of civil liberties, accountability and political and economic 
freedoms on growth (Sirowy & Inkeles, 1990). 
The ambiguity of the relationship between the polity and economic growth 
in the literature is also reflected in the empirical analysis of the dataset. The 
graph below illustrates the effect of democracy on log of GDP per capita for 
each sample.  
 
Figure 1. The Effect of Democratic Institutions on Economic Growth 
 
Note: The graph illustrates the relationship between the level of democratization and 
log of GDP per capita. This is given by the regression results 1.2 and 1.3 in Table 3. 
For the high income economies, Δln gdp = -0.240ΔXDem + 0.032ΔXDem2 and, for the 
middle and low-income economies, Δln gdp = 0.060ΔXDem – 0.170ΔXDem2).    
 
The figure above shows that increasing the level of democracy affects 
growth rates of developed countries differently from those of developing 
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countries. The first step towards understanding this difference is to identify the 
differences between high-income countries and middle and low-income 
countries in order to understand why democracy may affect the economy 
differently in each sample. Developed and developing economies differ in 
several aspects of political, economic and social life. The differences that are 
most relevant to this study are in the areas of income distribution, institutional 
efficiency and transparency, the nature and size of the public sector, the 
provision of public goods and public investment in social welfare 
As the Kuznets curve illustrates, income inequality is rises in the low to 
middle-income range, after which it starts to fall. Thus, in general, the countries 
in the sample of middle and low-income economies will have greater income 
inequality. Moreover, Sacks (2010) finds that individual well-being is 
significantly correlated with income level, so that the citizenry of high-income 
countries are more likely to have “life satisfaction”. This would also presumably 
make for a more peaceful society. Given that democratic governments are 
characterized by greater spending on public welfare and more meritocratic 
institutions, it is easy to see how the potential economic benefits of 
democratization would be great for the third world, especially in the area of 
income inequality.  
With regard to public spending, Devarajan, et al. (1996) argue that the 
developing world may be growing slower due to the misallocation of public 
investment. They find that overinvestment in capital goods slows growth, and 
suggest that the public sector in developing countries should shift expenditure 
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from capital investment to consumption goods. It is intuitive that democratic 
states face greater pressure for expenditure on welfare and consumption, 
particularly as they are accountable to the electorate and must satisfy voters in 
order to remain in power. Government expenditures that yield immediate 
benefits are, therefore, likely to be favored in democratic regimes. This finding 
is of importance here as, not only does it refute one of the main arguments for 
authoritarianism in the third world, but is also reaffirmed by the upward growth 
trajectory of developing countries as democratization takes place This work 
suggests, therefore, that the democratic regimes’ lower propensity to save may 
be beneficial for the third world.  
Moreover, given the freedoms and liberalization that accompany 
democratization, the upward trajectory of developing countries in Figure 1 may 
also be explained by the economic benefits of these. While the economic effect 
of the extension of civil liberties is a source of contention, many economists 
argue that such freedoms are a necessary condition for economic growth 
(Nelson and Singh, 1998). Further, sociopolitical freedoms and the abilities to 
receive an education, find adequate employment and to actively participate in 
society are best granted by democratic regimes, which are necessarily more 
receptive to the needs of the citizenry. It is clear how such a climate would 
better promote education, employment, competition and efficiency.  
 Mourmouras and Rangazas (2008) point out that the public sector expands 
as development occurs and the economy shifts from traditional to modern 
production methods. The discrepancy they find is that today’s developing 
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economies have a larger government size relative to their development level, 
than today’s developed world and explain that this may be a result of less 
democratic institutions. The economists find that larger public sectors obstruct 
modernization through higher tax rates, which may result from a lack of concern 
for economic development and modernization, or from the political leverage of 
the landed elites. The problem for economic growth lies in a large, 
undemocratic public sector that inefficiently allocates resources. Thus, middle 
and low-income economies tend to have large public sectors, but are unlikely to 
have democratic governments, resulting in a prolonged dependence on the 
traditional sector. Again, it is easy to see how the economic benefits of 
democratization – in this case, modernization of the economy – would be large 
for developing countries, in particular. 
For the middle and low-income countries sample, therefore, democratization 
is especially conducive to economic growth, as it has the potential to reduce 
inequality and increase general well being, liberalize the sociopolitical and 
economic structures and efficiently allocate resources. In contrast to this, 
democratization in the high-income economies has a more ambiguous effect on 
economic growth. In fact, as these countries first begin to democratize, the 
effect on economic growth is negative. When they reach a level of 3.75 (on the 
democracy scale of 0-10) the relationship inverts and positive and increasing 
returns set in.  
As discussed above, the literature suggests several channels through which 
the process of democratization may have negative effects on economic growth. 
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The first question to consider is the allocation of resources, as this is the most 
important channel through which the polity can affect economic growth. In an 
advanced democracy, which has transparent voting and justice systems, the 
government will presumably utilize resources efficiently and with the aim of 
producing the best public good and economic development. In a weak 
democracy, however, there is less accountability and corrupt politicians may 
loot public resources (Collier & Hoeffler, 2007). The wealth of high-income 
economies makes them more susceptible to this outcome, as the potential profits 
of corruption are very large. Moreover, as people gain more freedom and 
education, they also develop the means to voice their opinions, demand their 
rights and play a part in the policy-making process. Thus, at earlier stages, while 
institutions are still weak and governments do not have the legitimacy those of 
more advanced democracies do, social conflict and unrest may rise and this can 
negatively affect growth rates. These factors can explain much of the variation 
in the effects of democracy between the developing and the developed countries 
samples. Corruption, unjust and inefficient institutions and social unrest are 
issues that are characteristic of developing nations regardless of political 
regime.  
The idea that there will be less accountability at lower levels of democracy 
than in an authoritarian regime is contingent upon the assumption that the 
authoritarian regime in question is relatively benevolent and just, and has an 
efficient law and order system. In the case of most developing nations this is not 
the case, as most states are autocratic, and are also rife with corruption. Thus, it 
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is plausible that even a weak democratic regime may have marginally better 
checks and balances. In the case of the high-income nations, on the other hand, 
those that are highly autocratic are countries such as, Bahrain, UAE and Saudi 
Arabia, which have well-developed autocratic institutions and, though there is 
little freedom, these countries enjoy relative sociopolitical stability. It is not 
surprising then, that weak democratic institutions may be relatively less 
favorable for economic growth than the well-established autocratic regimes. 
Thus, while the effects of democratic institutions may be negative at first, at 
higher levels of democracy, the positive gains set in.  
It is also important to consider possible biases in the data. First, of the 41 
high-income countries, over 25% are identified oil-exporters, while only under 
10% of the middle and low-income countries are identified as such. Many oil-
rich countries tend to have authoritarian governments as well as high incomes, 
and it is now believed that petro-states are unique in their development issues, 
trajectories and solutions. It is interesting to note that removing the oil-
exporting countries from the high-income sample alters the relationship, as 
shown in Figure 2. This illustrates that the relationship between the polity and 
economic growth may be different in the context of resource abundance, a 
finding that is explored in the next section.  
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Figure 2. The Effect of Democratic Institutions on Economic Growth in high-
income, non oil-exporting countries.
 
Note: This graph shows the effect of an increase in the level of democratization on log 
of GDP per capita, for a subset of high-income economies that excludes the oil-
producing countries. This is in accordance with regression 2.2 in Table 4, so that Δln 
gdp = --0.137XDem + 0.024 XDem2.    
 
 
 
4.3. The Role of the Polity in the Natural Resource Curse 
 While the statistical findings indicated that natural resource abundance, 
in isolation from other factors, is beneficial for economic growth, interacting the 
former with democracy resulted in a negative and significant effect on economic 
growth. The natural resource curse exists, therefore, but only for countries 
which have democratic regimes. Economists agree that, in the absence of 
institutions that effectively check corruption, natural resource endowments 
result in a resource curse. Robinson et al. (2006) find that natural resource 
booms create perverse political incentives that, in the absence of good 
institutions, cause the natural resource curse. Thus, without an independent 
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judiciary, for example, politicians are more likely to misuse natural resource 
rents to remain in power.  
 Collier and Hoeffler (2007) emphasize the need for checks and balances 
in controlling the negative incentives created by natural resource rents. This is 
especially relevant as they conclude that the lack of checks and balances in 
developing countries makes democracy unfavorable for growth. High resource 
rents exacerbate the issue of corruption in such countries as they increase 
embezzlement, so that politicians use resource revenues for their own political 
gain rather than for the provision of public goods. This paper confirms this 
conclusion, but also extends it to the developed world. Tables 3, 4 and 5 show 
that the negative effect of natural resource abundance, where there is a 
democratic regime, is even greater for the high-income sample. 
 Thus, on average, even in high-income, resource-rich economies, 
democratic regimes may give rise to the natural resource curse. Figure 3 shows 
the effect on GDP per capita of an increase in the level of democratization at 
various levels of natural resource dependence. For the middle and low-income 
sample, increasing the level of democratization positively affects growth at low 
levels of resource dependence. As natural resource dependence increases, the 
positive affect is increasingly diluted. Beyond a resource dependence level of 
35%, increasing democratization reduces income per capita. This confirms 
Collier & Hoeffler’s (2007) finding that promoting democracy in the resource-
rich, developing world will not have positive effects on economic development. 
The sample of high-income economies extends this finding to the developed 
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world as well. As the regression results showed, democratization reduces 
income per capita in high-income economies. As Figure 3 shows, at higher 
levels of resource dependence, the negative affect increases in magnitude at a 
rate faster than that for developing countries. This indicates that democratization 
is even more harmful for high-income economies at higher levels of resource-
dependence than for low-income economies. 
 
Figure 3. The effect on log of GDP of increasing the level of democracy by 1 unit 
depends on whether or not there is natural resource abundance 
 
Note: The graph shows the effect on log of GDP of increasing SXP by 10% at various 
levels of democracy. This is given by regressions 1.2 and 1.3 in Table 3. For the high-
income sample this is given by the equation, Δln gdp = ΔXDem * (-0.240 + 0.032ΔXDem 
– 0.243Xsxp), and for the middle and low-income sample, the equation is Δln gdp = 
ΔXDem * (0.060 – 0.170XSXP). 
 
  The literature suggests that democratization only has this effect in the 
case of resource-rich, developing countries where institutions are less 
transparent and efficient and there is little accountability. The data, however, 
suggests that democratic institutions are even less beneficial for high-income, 
resource-rich countries. A look at this subset of resource-rich (those with an 
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average SXP value greater than 0.1) high-income economies provides some 
insight. Figure 4 shows that the more resource-dependent economies tend to 
have autocratic regimes. These include countries such as Bahrain, Oman, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE, which have high levels of resource-dependence 
and autocratic institutions, but also enjoy high levels of income per capita. 
Moreover, as the regression results in Table 4 show, excluding the oil-producing 
nations from the sample does not alter this negative effect.  
 
Figure 4. Democracy and SXP Levels for a sample of High-Income, Resource-Rich 
Countries.  
 
Note: This graph shows observations of democracy level and SXP for a sample of high-
income and resource-rich economies. This is a subset of the high-income sample, 
which excludes all the high-income countries, which have an average SXP value below 
0.1 for the 1960-99 period. 
 
 Taking a different approach to interpreting the interaction variable, 
figure 4 shows the effect of increasing SXP by 10% on log of GDP per capita, 
when the effect of an increase in SXP depends on the level of democratization. 
This illustrates the statistical result that natural resource abundance holds 
greater benefits for economic development in less democratic societies. In fact, 
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in highly democratic societies, an increase in the level of natural resource 
dependence reduces income per capita. This finding holds true for the sample of 
developing economies as well as, high-income economies. Thus, autocratic 
states are more likely to benefit from natural resource dependence than 
democratic states, as having a large natural resource endowment poses greater 
problems for countries that have democratic institutions. 
 
Figure 5. The effect on log of GDP of increasing SXP by 10% depends on the level 
of democratization. 
 
Note: The graph shows the effect on log of GDP of increasing SXP by 10% at various 
levels of democracy. For the high-income sample this is given by the equation, Δln gdp 
= ΔSXP * (1.63 -0.243XDem), and for the middle and low-income sample, the equation 
is Δln gdp = ΔSXP * (0.501 -0.170XDem). 
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5. Conclusion  
 
 While democratization of institutions is significantly beneficial for 
economic growth, this holds true only for resource-poor economies. In general, 
democratic regimes do not utilize natural resources in a way that is conducive 
for economic development. This finding holds true for countries at high levels 
of development as well as low. Let us focus on the high-income, resource-rich 
countries as these may hold some policy lessons for those that have been less 
successful.  
 There are countries at both ends of the democratic spectrum in this 
group, with countries like Norway, Iceland and Canada performing successfully 
under democratic regimes, and countries like Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and UAE 
reaching high development levels under autocratic regimes. The success of the 
above advanced democracies is contradictory to the general trend, where 
democracy negatively impacts natural resource-dependent countries. The 
literature largely suggests that this may be the result of a mature and transparent 
system, which does not allow corruption, bribery and misallocation of 
resources. Another important point is that high levels of social, political and 
economic advancement result in general well being, a satisfied citizenry and 
little unrest. In such conditions, democratization is unlikely to spur factionalism 
and violent struggles for control of the resources. The results might not be so 
favorable, however, in more unequal economies.  
 Thus, it is important to consider that there are other important policies 
that regimes of resource-rich countries must adopt that are not particular to 
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either democratic or autocratic regimes. One of these may be the manner in 
which resource rents are utilized, so that governments that loot rather than 
invest them in long-term development will prevent economic growth, whether 
they are democratic or autocratic. Another is the establishment of efficient 
property rights and laws that will favor the investment and the growth of the 
private sector. Although these characteristics may exist in any regime, they are 
generally believed to be closely associated with democratization. Only in the 
case of such a mature democracy can democratic institutions be beneficial for 
economic growth in resource-rich countries (Eifert, et al., 2002). As such a 
polity may take years to develop, marginal steps towards democratization hold 
little benefits. Instead, they serve to increase instability and opportunities for 
corruption, so that autocratic regimes are preferable in all cases except for the 
perfect democracies. 
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